Tuesday 30 July 2013

‘Pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’

When Arundhati Roy candidly wrote about the discourse of ‘Anti-Americanism’ through which dissenting voices are suppressed, she was obviously talking about the American establishment. What if she had been living and engaged in activism in Pakistan? Would she have written about the discourse of ‘pro-Americanism’ through which dissenting voices are suppressed by sections of media, urban middle classes and sections of the state’s establishment of Pakistan? 

Ms. Roy writes:

To call someone anti-American, indeed, to be anti American, (or for that matter anti-Indian, or anti-Timbuktuan ) is not just racist, it’s a failure of the imagination. An inability to see the world in terms other than those that the establishment has set out for you: If you’re not a Bushie, you’re a Taliban. If you don’t love us, you hate us. If you’re not Good, you’re Evil. If you’re not with us, you’re with the terrorists.[1]

Just change the adjectives and subject determiner a bit and you find a very interesting co-relation the opposite of what Arundhati Roy proclaims but with the same effect. May it like this that to call someone anti-Talibanization, indeed, to be against the militant disocurse necessarily mean pro-American? And this is also in an environment where pro-Americanism incites the worst kind of violence. Even if not violence, at least suppression of one’s voice or loss of political support.  The discourse of pro-Americanism has interesting denominations in Pakistan. You would be considered a good Muslim and a patriot when you supported the US war against the Soviets by terming it jihad in Afghanistan back in 1980s. You are the worst kind of a traitor and pro-American if you refuse to accept the discourse of violent extremism in Pakistan that has damaged only and only the state and society of Pakistan. To understand relationship of violent extremism in Pakistan and American presence and drone strikes, please read my blog on http://hussainkhadim79.blogspot.com/2013/06/imran-khans-press-conference-in.html.     

I have otherwise great respect for Rahimullah Yousufzai, a veteran journalist working in The News, but it is in the interest of the fundamental human right that one expresses his/her difference of opinion in matters related to our collective life. It is perhaps true for respectable Rahimullah Yousufzai as much as for a common citizen like me.      
                                      
While discussing ANP- JUI seat-to-seat adjustment for by-elections 2013 in his piece published in the News on Sunday on July 28 2013, Rahimullah sahib has decreed that ANP is a Pro-US political party.  Irrespective of the fact that one would have expected the same kind of analysis during pre 2013 polls on the JUI –QWP seat-to-seat adjustment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on the one hand and PML-N Balochs and Pakhtun Nationalist Parties in Balochistan on the other hand, let’s concentrate on the core issue of ‘Pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’ discourse. Before  dilating on the issue of ‘pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’, let’s first analyze the statement per se and find some visible logical fallacies there.  

First, who makes foreign policy in Pakistan? If a political party in Pakistan is even unable to talk about foreign policy, how come it is dubbed pro or anti any other country? If the statement means that ANP has not declared jihad against the Americans in Afghanistan after 2011, then which other political party has so far done it?   

Second, what are the indicators of being ‘pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’?  Is it worldview? If working for a modern polity and use of modern technology constitutes this worldview, then perhaps even Taliban share the same worldview.  Is it strategic, which of course includes support or not support for drones? A veteran like Rahimullah Yousufzai might certainly remember that it was only ANP which took protest rally against the drone strike in Bajaur in 2006. Is it political, which certainly includes dialogue with those militant organizations which can delink from Al-Qaeda? Again our senior journalist might remember that ANP initiated dialogue with the Taliban in Swat in 2008 despite substantial American pressure.
Third, the discourse of hegemony and resistance to hegemony in Pakistan perhaps originates from the politics of Khudai Khidmatgars and National Awami Party—both the predecessors of ANP.                                                
I leave it to the imagination and information of the readers to find out the history of relations between the US and Pakistan starting from 1950s till date.





[1] Arundhati Roy. An ordinary person’s guide to empire. Dheli: Penguin. 2005

Monday 29 July 2013

On-party basis

http://jang.com.pk/thenews/Jul2013-weekly/nos-28-07-2013/spr.htm#5

The three previous local government systems, installed by the un-elected military rulers, played a crucial role in prolonging their regimes and de-politicising people at grassroot level
By Khadim Hussain
To fulfill the core objective of a constitutional federal democracy, almost all the established democracies of the world have put in place three tiers of governance — federal, provincial and local tier.
This is because, as an expert would put it, we cannot realise the full benefit of democratic government unless we begin by the admission that all problems are not central problems. The results of problems not central require decision at the place and by the persons, who feel the problems most deeply.
Political scientists agree the objective of participation and representation of the common masses in state decision-making may remain un-realised if the third tier of governance is missing in the political system. Easy accessibility, responsive governance and sustainable development might be the outcomes of a genuine local government system.
Article 140-A (1) of the Constitution of Pakistan says, “each province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local government”. This ensures empowerment of the people, which leads towards ownership of the state by common masses.
It is interesting to note that in Pakistan it was the non-elected usurpers of power who remained keen to install a system of local government. They wished to achieve two objectives from the elected local governments. First, they wanted to create a constituency that has stakes in the non-elected regime by having a semblance of participation and representation. In this case, the local government system would work as an ‘arm of bureaucracy’.
Second, they wanted to deprive political parties of their support base on the local level and divert the attention of the masses from the broader spectrum of policy-making in the country. It is precisely due to these reasons that political parties tend to shy away from holding local bodies polls whenever they are in power.
The first local government system was installed by General Muhammad Ayub Khan in 1959. The system was termed ‘basic democracies’ and elections for the purpose were held on non-party basis. The ‘basic democracies’ were later used by General Ayub to prolong his stay in power.
General Ziaul Haq followed his predecessor by promulgating Ordinance of Local Government in 1979. Elections to this system were also held on non-party basis. Both the systems had envisioned limited representation of the people at the local level because only a part of administrative responsibility was devolved to the local tier of governance without financial and political responsibility and authority.
The third local government system was put in place by General Musharraf in 2001. This system is distinguished from the earlier two systems as parts of the administrative, financial and political responsibility and authority were devolved to the local government in three layers — union, tehsil and district council. The District Management Group of bureaucracy was supposed to coordinate between the local government and the concerned departments. Elections to this system were also held on non-party basis. The union council Nazims, Tehsil Nazims and District Nazims under this system later facilitated referendum held by General Musharraf in 2002.
Leaving aside the theoretical constructs, all the previous three local government systems played a crucial role in prolonging the un-elected regimes besides de-politicisation of the people at grassroots level. This was effectively carried out by keeping political parties away from the local government system. As it is simply not a coincidence that all the three non-elected regimes held elections to local government on non-party basis, there seem to be three implications of holding non-party elections for any local government system in Pakistan.
First, people at the grassroots level are delinked from the broader spectrum of national policies and governance. They are tempted to remain engaged in the smaller spectrum and, consequently, lose sense of the implications of state’s policies regarding foreign affairs, security issues and defense. This creates a cadre that is unable to see through the connectivity of local, provincial and federal level statehood. Hence, a non-political local representative cadre amenable to be used for any policy that is formed at the central level and that has deep bearing on the lives of the people at the grassroots level.
Second, devoid of a larger narrative of a political party, people at the grassroots level get embroiled in more biradarism, sectarianism, and isolationism, and, hence, more polarisation at the grassroots level ensues. This is why instead of playing the role of nurseries for political workers, local government systems in Pakistan have been producing a cadre that is vulnerable to the temptations of more money and more power at the cost of democratisation of state and society. The omnipresent tendency of changing loyalties in Pakistani politics for power and pelf indicates this trend beyond any doubt.
Third, genuine devolution of political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority may not happen unless centralisation of power and governance is done away with as per principle. In the absence of political parties, it becomes easier for bureaucracy and political elite at the central and provincial level to manipulate and tamper with the basic principles of devolution. While, in principle, it is only political parties that have worked on coordinated and coherent development policies, absence of political parties in the local government system might result in sporadic and unsustainable grassroots level development.
Giving a little space of participation and governance to the people at the cost of genuine empowerment, responsive governance and sustainable development has been the prime objective of the establishment and political elite in Pakistan.
Political parties by virtue of being forums to accommodate voices of the common people to resist marginalisation and disenfranchisement must have a predominant role in policy-making, governance and development at the central, provincial and local tiers of governance.
The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.
khadimhussain565@gmail.com
twitter@khadimhussain4

Wednesday 24 July 2013

‘Corrupt’, ‘Traitor’, and ‘Immoral

In the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic fabric of the state and society of Pakistan, dissenting voices, diverse indigenous narratives and parallel spaces in power have been consistently denied room by the Power through a formidable discourse of Political Economy and Geo-politics. The discourse is constituted of three loaded idioms---‘Corruption’, ‘Immorality’ and being ‘Traitor’. Previously, this formidable discourse was permeated through Urdu print media and state electronic media, and presently the same discourse is permeated through Urdu media, electronic media and social media. Two sets each of three strands need to be noticed in this discourse.

The first set of three strands:

First, victims and target of this discourse have been observed to be co-incidentally those individuals, groups, political parties, research and media forums and creative arts groups that hold an alternative view to what is usually the stated policy of the establishment.

Second, interestingly, the discourse has been observed to be used consistently against those mentioned above who in a particular point of time have thought differently from what state institutions have thought of in certain state domains. These domains include foreign policy, state security policy, defense policy and the state’s ideological inclination. (Is there something wrong with the genetic making of all those who think differently in the above domains that they must be ‘traitors and agents of foreign powers’, ‘corrupt’, and ‘immoral’?).

Third, the use of this discourse has been observed to be vociferously made when there is an event of some significance for the state and society. In the case of the state of Pakistan, one may count numerous examples like passage of Objective Resolution in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1948, the secession of East Pakistan and turning East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971, the US-Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1980s, Pak-India dialogue on several occasions, attack on Malala Yousufzai in Swat in 2012, the OBL saga in May 2011 and NATO pull out from Afghanistan in 2014. All these events relate to either Geo-politics or Political Economy of the State.

The second set of three strands:

First, embedded semantic value in all the three idioms of ‘corrupt’, ‘immoral’ and ‘traitor’ seem to be connected. ‘Corrupt’ practice indicates deviation from the established ethical foundation of governance. ‘Immoral’ tendency shows violation of the established moral code of a particular society, while ‘traitor and foreign agent’ depicts a perceived despicable behavior in modern consciousness based on the concept of social contract between an individual and a state.

This strand seems to originate from the colonial and tribo-feudal construct of the discourse of political economy to isolate, marginalize and disenfranchise an individual, a group or a community. The power that desires to control a whole population socially, politically, culturally and economically would logically tend to first prove the population incapable to think, govern themselves and live a civilized life. This leaves little space for any alternative and indigenous narrative. 
  
One can find examples of similarities in techniques used by all imperial powers, tribo-feudal traditions and security nation states to bring about an overwhelming control of human intellect, collective emotions and growth in collective socio-political consciousness. They would first enforce a certain code of behavior, particular set of ethics and peculiar patterns of thought to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of those who can observe contradictions in the established norms, see socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic dis empowerment of the common masses, certain political groups and communities. To deny space to such voices, all the forces mentioned above would then use various techniques to disenfranchise a particular individual, party, group, community or gender. One of the techniques is the use of    corrupt’, ‘immoral’ and ‘traitor’ discourse against them. 
   
Second, consistent, coherent and systematic means of communications and indoctrination are used by the Power for connecting the discourse of power and for disenfranchising the dissenting voices and indigenous narratives. The means of communication used for permeation of the discourse of power seem coherent in various domains like education, mainstream media, social media, public discourse, constitutional discourse, legal discourse and institutional discourse.

Third, the Power ensures sustainability of intellectual and emotional control and perpetuation of the discourse of power through organizing several operational strategies. One of the operational strategies is to monopolize information and centralize dissemination of information. It is then very easier to block the dissenting voices, indigenous narratives and creative non-conformism on the one hand and on the other hand it becomes quite convenient for the Power to use  the discourse of    corrupt’, ‘immoral’ and ‘traitor’ against the challenging agents of change.  


What can be the strategy of the agents of change, those who pursue creativity, those who accommodate and celebrate diversity and those who wish to stand for the dis empowered,  disenfranchised and disadvantaged in such circumstances? 

Monday 22 July 2013

The obscurant discourse

http://dawn.com/news/1031018

THE utter confusion of the socio-political discourse in Pakistan’s state and society is manifest in the latter two’s response to three distinct yet interwoven discourse patterns.
First, the response to the threat that extremism and terrorism have posed to society and the state seems to be consciously or unconsciously made ambiguous through raising irrational and contradictory questions over and over again.
Those sections of the state and society which are instrumental in subverting and manipulating the discourse might wish to establish intellectual control over the masses that would rather live a life of peace and prosperity.
Instead of working out a comprehensive and coordinated policy to mitigate the threat, the middle classes and state functionaries in Pakistan muddle the response by indulging in incoherent debates to figure out the ‘real cause’ behind the menace.
In contrast to the clear policy stand and systematic strategies militant organisations evolve to defeat the state and establish their writ, state functionaries and the middle classes would have us believe that terrorism exists because of state vacuums — the lack of speedy justice and education, poverty and unemployment.
Moreover, they would have us believe that extremism and terrorism originated in Pakistan after 9/11.
At the same time, they raise the point that terrorism crossed over the border from Afghanistan and landed in Pakistan for no reason. Drone strikes are yet another purported reason. State functionaries and the middle classes still keep singing the mantra of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban.
Though one would rather see state vacuums filled sooner than later, the confusion thus created results in the inability of both the state and society to construct an alternative discourse based on pluralism, human rights and constitutional democracy.
The confusion also strips the government, state institutions and civil society of the ability to evolve a coherent, coordinated and comprehensive counter-extremism and counterterrorism policy.
Second, ambivalence and inconsistency in using collective wisdom to formulate foreign policy has created a dangerously polarised discourse.
Who should formulate foreign policy? What should be the guidelines for a consistent foreign policy? Should it be guided by our collective insecurities or by geo-economics? Should we strive towards acting on common interests with other states and societies or name permanent ‘enemies’ and permanent ‘friends’?
Should we engage in a meaningful dialogue on issues related to foreign policy or dub those who differ with us as ‘traitors’ and ‘agents’, and silence dissenting voices through the use of force?
It seems that at the core of the debate on foreign policy is the fundamental question of the supremacy of parliament. Perhaps until this question is resolved in Pakistan, the foreign policy discourse will remain obscure.
Third, the response to the attack on Malala Yousafzai last year and the celebration of Malala Day this year has clearly indicated a fractured socio-cultural fabric in Pakistan. The discourse on Malala as a symbol of education and civilisation was obscured by raising questions about her integrity, humanity and intentions.
The simple fact is that a young Pakistani girl who wanted to go to school and who wanted other girls and boys to go to school was shot in the head by militants while she was on her way home from school. The other fact is that well-meaning people in Pakistan and abroad stood by her and condemned the attackers for the sake of education and civilisation.
The Malala discourse does not only represent modern civilisation; it also symbolises the historical continuity of the land. Malala has not only taken the discourse of human dignity, pluralism and constitutional democracy forward but has also recognised the Gandhara, Indus and Islamic civilisations.
Malala today symbolises the struggle of all those prophets, saints, revolutionaries and freedom fighters who stood for indigenous wisdom and identity, freedom and equality, irrespective of creed, caste, gender, race and religion. She represents those who triggered human creativity and innovation.
Instead of supporting this discourse, sections of the state and society in Pakistan have created confusion. Starting from questions related to the attack on Malala to questions about her ability to write diaries and speak in public, a consistent effort has been made to malign her as an ‘agent’ of CIA, RAW and Mossad.
Illogical comparisons between her and those killed in drone strikes as well as Aafia Siddiqui are drawn to obfuscate the discourse on civilisation.
As her voice for education and civilisation gets stronger, sections of Pakistanis become more insecure. This third response indicates a rupture between Pakistan’s state and society and modern human civilisation.
The question one is tempted to ask is whether this is a collective suicidal tendency or a yearning for achieving perceived ‘national and strategic interests’. Is this rupture because of the manufacturing factory that is our education system or because of political segregation and isolation from the modern world?
Civil society organisations, political parties, the academia, media and state institutions in Pakistan have to engage in deep deliberations and dialogue to identify and address these ruptures. Threats and weaknesses have to be converted into strengths and opportunities.
Holding the rest of the world responsible for whatever goes wrong with us won’t work for too long.
The writer is a political analyst.
khadimhussain565@gmail.com

Wednesday 17 July 2013

Of PTI led coalition government and Education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Several print media outlets reported on the working groups formed to reform the educational sector in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the PTI led government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The News reports:

The provincial working group for reforms in education sector in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has formed five sub-groups, which would submit recommendations and line of action within one month. The groups consisted of officials of education department, educationists, World Bank, GIZ and experts from other organizations. The first group would work on curriculum, textbooks and teachers’ training, and the second group would look after governance, third would have focus on access and equality, fourth on adult education, skill development and fifth on the role of private sector. The groups were formed in the first meeting of the provincial working group with Education Minister Mohammad Atif in the chair. The meeting was attended by secretary education Joudat Ayaz, director education Mohammad Rafiq Khattak, representatives of different organisations and members of the group. Briefing media persons after the meeting, the education minister said that education policy already existed. He said the working groups would give recommendation and the action plan would be given the shape of a report within one month and presented for before the coalition partners for consultation.[1]

While the Daily Dawn reports:


Provincial Minister for Elementary and Secondary Education Mohammad Atif will head the group, while E&SE secretary will be its member/secretary. Other members of the group on education include ex-chief secretary Abdullah, Elementary Education Foundation MD Ghazala H Saifi, Rayed Afzal, Zulfiqar Ahmad, Umbreen Arif, Dr Rukhsana Zia, Dr Arif Nazir Butt, Prof Mohammad Memon and Musarrat Qadeem.[2]

Looking at the mandate that “the first group would work on curriculum, textbooks and teachers’ training, and the second group would look after governance, third would have focus on access and equality, fourth on adult education, skill development and fifth on the role of private sector”, and at the composition of the groups, one is tempted to raise a few seemingly pertinent points.

First, all the sectors of educational reforms mentioned above pertain to policy issues, then what was the need to form groups when “education policy already existed”? Is this only proving the point that PTI led coalition government was well-prepared to govern the province? I think the otherwise. The “education policy already existed” statement perhaps refers to the elections manifestos presented by PTI and JI to the masses in May 2013 elections . It is hence pertinent to quote salient features of JI and PTI’s policy of education described in their manifestos. The PTI website summarizes education policy as:

To end discrimination in the field of education and give all our children a level playing field, PTI will bring in place ONE education system for all. Education spending will be increased from 2% to 5% of GDP in 5 years. A fully detailed education policy has been charted out to completely restructure education which we will build up to eventually being free right up to University level. Girls’ education is a central focus of our education policy with the aim to double Girls High Schools in 5 years.[3]

Leaving alone the budgetary allocations in which the PTI led provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa miserably failed to fulfill its  promise, let’s try to understand the “ONE education system for all” which has been perhaps described by the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa eloquently:

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Pervez Khan Khattak Tuesday said that the government would introduce uniform syllabus from the next academic year. Speaking as a chief guest at the award distribution ceremony at a school here, he said that the curriculum of the Aitchison would be introduced at all the state-run schools.[4]

To understand Aitchison College, I quote a brief paragraph from its website:

Aitchison College is one such place which its existence to people whose knowledge and vision 125 years ago, even today reverberates strongly. The College was originally named as Punjab Chiefs College on 2ndJanuary 1886 and was renamed as Aitchison College on 13th November 1886 to honour the services of Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab through whose efforts the College was established.[5]

Keeping in view that the stated policy of the PTI, in all probability, would necessitate that medium of instruction be English and there will be an effort that madrassas, public schools, private schools, garrison schools and federal government schools adopt a liberal curriculum with the denial to give space to indigenous languages and diverse cultures. Apart from being too imaginative, this effort might face severe resistance from all interest groups of civil society and bureaucracy. This effort shall also marginalize cultural and linguistic minorities a little more.

The Jamati Islam (JI) declares about education in its election manifesto:

A uniform education system in harmony with the Islamic teachings would be devised for the whole country to end class split and to forge national unity. Urdu would be adopted as medium of instruction and regional languages would be developed. Hundred per cent literacy would be achieved within only five years. Students Unions would be restored. [6]

While in its Defense Policy JI declares:

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan has said in its Electoral Manifesto for election 2013 that If it came into power, It will make arrangements for compulsory military civil defense training for all citizens, men and women, between ages of 18 and 35…The JI also declares that “nation and military would also be infused with the passion of Jihad’ (Trans from Urdu).[7]

Keeping in view that Mr. Abdullah (Ex-Chief Secretary of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), the well known JI ideologue, is on the working group on education; let’s keep our fingers crossed whether homogenization of ‘passionate jihad’ wins or liberal homogenization wins.

Second, in both paradigms of liberal homogenization and religious homogenization, higher education has been completely ceded to the Centre (no working group is formed or portfolio is announced for Higher Education). If this is conscious, then it is the first step towards reversal of the 18th Constitutional Amendment passed with consensus in April 2010[8] in which higher education has been specifically mentioned to be devolved to the provinces with the assurance of the autonomy of universities as seats of higher learning.

Talk of the town is that Director Pakistan Study Centre University of Peshawar, who has remained Naazim-e-Aala of Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba, the students’ wing of JI, is being deputed to the Pakhtunkhwa Textbook Board. While Mr. Abdullah on the Curriculum and Prof. Fakhr-ul-Islam on the Textbook Board, what will be the shape of education in the coming five years in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? Perhaps homogenization, segregation, jihadization, isolation from both indigenous history and modern human civilization is the ultimate objective. Where does QWP stand?




Wednesday 3 July 2013

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly and Government Heading towards Homogenization, Isolation, Puritanism, and Segregation

As soon as the thundering speech asking separate women assemblies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the rest of the country by the Jamat-e-Islami’s Honourable Senior Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Siraj-ul- Haq, was about to  fade a bit, a woman lawmaker from Jamiat-e-Ulamai Islam tabled a resolution to ban what she termed ‘immoral’ programs on public and private channels. The press reports are silent pertaining to the examples of ‘immorality’ she must have observed on TV channels. In all probability, she must have mentioned the dress code of women appearing in dramas and talk shows, scenes of relationships of men and women and music played on the channels[1].

As if it was not enough, the same woman law maker tabled a resolution that a private bus service, Daewoo, must be forced to stop for Namaz (prayers). The resolution was unanimously passed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly[2]. There are two interesting but subtle assumptions in this resolution. First, all passengers on board Daewoo must be Muslims and, second, all passengers must be Hanafi Deobandis. So if you are Christian or a Shia, you will be charged for the personal faith of others.

Another interesting statement came from no one else but the Honourable Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pervez Khattak, saying that ‘Muslims should not be sweepers and all slots of janitor’s work in the province must be given to ‘minorities’ ”[3]. If it were to accommodate non-Muslims, the CM would have ordered for equal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims in the job market. The statement seems to be related to the superiority of Muslims and the denigration of non-Muslims (which is against the Quranic verse saying that ‘We have bestowed all humans with dignity’). It is also meant to perpetually keep a large population of Christians in the dungeon of low caste humans. Please see expression of a young Christian reported by Express Tribune:

  “Nothing changes for us,” says Masih. “We will live and die sweeping.”
When Masih speaks, he projects a certain acceptance of social realities. He has two children, lives in a small home in Cantt, and makes Rs12,000 a month, for which he is grateful. Although his children go to school, he foresees that they too will become sweepers. “We are born for this work. The majority of Christians work as sweepers. So why should my kids expect to lead a life that is different from mine?” he questions. Though some may think it a negative attitude to take, Masih has a point. He talks from experience. Three of his elder brothers hold the same job in different areas around Peshawar. “What are the benefits of education for our people when we know that, ultimately, none of us will amount to more than sweepers? We will be sweepers even if we are graduates,” he says. According to the K-P Auqaf, Hajj and Religious Affairs Department, minorities make up 0.4% of the total population of the province, which comes to 70,000 individuals. This figure includes Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Balmkee, Kalasha, Ahmadis and Parsis. The last census report illustrates that Christians outnumber other minority groups. Despite having lived in the same areas for considerable time periods, Christians still sit on the fringes, looking in. “We have lived in Peshawar for centuries and have no problems as such. We perform our religious rituals in church and don’t face hurdles in that respect,” says Masih. “However, people generally don’t want to mingle with us socially.”[4]

There is yet another development. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa minister for Religious Affairs suggests that Ushr (tithe) needs to be introduced. Dawn reports:

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa minister for religious affairs Habibur Rehman on Tuesday said imposition of Ushr was inevitable in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as funds collected in the head of Zakat was dwindling gradually. Speaking on a calling attention notice during the provincial assembly session chaired by Speaker Asad Qaisar, the minister said after 18th amendment to the Constitution, the collection of Zakat was a provincial subject and the share of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had drastically decreased.[5]
There seems to be a competition among the Tehreek-e-Insaf, the Jamat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulamai Islam to outclass one another in further religiosing the already conservative Pashtun belt, thanks to the US-Soviet war in the 1980s in Afghanistan. One just wonders whether it is a deliberate effort to strengthen the discourse of Homogenization, Isolation, Puritanism, and Segregation or only Confidence Building Measures to be acceptable for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Diversity, democracy and peace will remain the victim in this part of the world. It is now increasingly becoming a fascination that once the socio-cultural environment in the Pashtun belt was ruled by a pluralist indigenous discourse of the land.