Quest for federalism—perspectives from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

http://www.citizenswire.com/quest-for-federalism-perspectives-from-khyber-pakhtunkhwa/

The demand for a genuine federal democratic republic of Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is as old as Pakistan itself and in some cases is even older than Pakistan. Initially, it was the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement and its various offshoots that struggled hard in the colonial era to win the status of a separate province with the right of adult franchise. The struggle that started for an autonomous province in the early 1920s culminated in the 1930s and as a result of which NWFP was made a separate province under the colonial constitutional framework of 1935. A separate NWFP assembly was formed after the elections held in 1937 in the united India.

After the inception of Pakistan, democratic secular nationalist entities from the then NWFP like Khudai Khidmatgars, and Balochistan, Sindh, the then Bengal and some leftists from Punjab formed People’s Party and later National Awami Party in the 1950s. The National Awami Party initiated its struggle in all parts of Pakistan on a three point agenda—separation of state and religion, provincial autonomy and an independent foreign policy. The National Awami Party started a mass movement across Pakistan, especially in NWFP, after General Ayub imposed martial law in the country and formed the notorious One Unit for the so-called parity between the Eastern and Western wings of Pakistan. The movement was later joined by the provincial chapters of Pakistan People’s Party, Jamiat-e-Ulamai Islam and Jamiat-e-Ulamai Pakistan.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the movement for autonomy of the provincial units of the federation for the political development of a genuine federal parliamentary democracy in Pakistan historically revolved around three major sets of grievances.

Besides long lasting struggle for identity, the first and the foremast on the agenda of the movement for autonomy and genuine federal democracy remained in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to be the issue of ownership and distribution of natural resources. Though not limited to water only,  the grievance over water gained prominence after hydroelectric power generation and irrigation channels from the water owned by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa legally, technically and traditionally were used by the centre for Punjab without the consent of and due compensation to the province. Other resources that the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa historically agitated and protested for include natural gas, cess on tobacco grown in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, precious stones, minerals and forestry besides tourism.

The second set of grievances pertains to economy that includes unequal development and investment in trade and commerce, infrastructure for trade and commerce, unequal development of industry and market, agriculture, fishery and poultry. The third set of issues that became the source of long lasting demands in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa includes public policy and governance. This set of grievances was assumed to be the direct consequence of the deprivations mentioned in the first and second sets of grievances. This was thought to be the result of the centrist mindset of state institutions.  Denial of justice, lack of the Rule of Law, bureaucratic hegemony, non-responsiveness of state institutions, and lack of basic facilities like sewerage, clean drinking water, due share in taxes and revenues continue to breed negative attitude for political, institutional and capitalist elite of Pakistan in the common masses of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The landmark 18^th Amendment passed and enacted in April 2010 not only resolved the issue of identity but also mitigated the grievance of resource distribution in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to some extent. Abolition of concurrent list altogether and bringing of Federal Legislative List II in the purview of the Council of Common Interests might have resolved most of the outstanding issues between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the centre. There are still three irritants that continue agitating the governments and people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa persistently.

Firstly, the issue of centralization of governance and distribution of power by the centre has continuously made relations between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the centre in jeopardy. Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) based in Lahore and managed by Islamabad is considered not only hegemonic but also a stumbling block in fulfilling the needs of electricity of the people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Secondly, there is a fear that devolution of certain institutions is being resisted by sections of the political, military and bureaucratic elite with lame excuses and invalid arguments. Resistance to allow devolution of Higher Education Commission to provinces is just one example to nourish the fear of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The resurrection of the ministry of education and health with pseudonyms after the PML-N government was elected to power in Islamabad strengthens the fear of the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that powerful sections of political, military and bureaucratic elite in Islamabad and Punjab are not sincere in realizing the dream of a genuine federal parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. As if it were not enough, the statement of the Federal Minister for Petroleum indicating review of the Article 158 of the constitution of Pakistan added salt to the injuries. Article 158 of the constitution of Pakistan had established the first right on the use of the natural gas and petroleum by the province where it is produced.

Thirdly, there is a strong demand by the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that half ownership of resources ensured in the 18^th  must be constitutionally converted to the full ownership of resources while share of the cost for administration of state and distribution of resources may be worked out  in the Council of Common Interests and National Finance Commission.

The third set of grievances mentioned above may be considered the domains of provincial governments exclusively after the 18^th Amendment and 7^th NFC Award. Responsibility for governance, law and order, education, health, socio-cultural development, women development, youth affairs, agriculture, tourism and local government must be taken up by the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Abdication of this responsibility by the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will be deemed as complicity in revoking autonomy and decentralization. The civil society, academia, professional organizations, media and research organizations have to form networking for taking ahead the true spirit of federal parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.

(The writer is a political analyst based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Email:khadimhussain565@gmail.com twitter/@khadimhussain4 )

Need for shared goals

http://dawn.com/news/1037071/need-for-shared-goals

PEACE within Afghanistan could largely depend on how regional states view their geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in the country in the backdrop of the 2014 withdrawal.

This is borne out by the policy statements of the new governments in Pakistan and Iran. China’s unusual dynamism in the region and President Asif Ali Zardari’s Central Asian visit some months back also lend credence to this assumption.

The boundary skirmishes and the subsequent exchange of allegations between Pakistan and India can also be viewed from the perspective of enhanced regional rivalry, especially with post-2014 Afghanistan now in sight.

Given this situation, policymakers and think tanks are mostly concerned with the identification of shared interests of regional states.

On the face of it, regional states would like to ensure their security and economic interests, an adequate flow of energy to keep economies afloat and routes for trade and commerce. There is cut-throat competition among the states to get as much as possible at minimum loss to themselves post 2014.

The competition among these states, with financial support from countries not in the region, has over time been virtually transformed into non-state proxy clashes within Afghanistan and in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal region.

It has been observed that the alleged Iranian quest for influence in Afghanistan is being resisted by Saudi-funded militias spread out in parts of Afghanistan. The newly emerged trade dynamism of China and India has been described as one reason behind the expansion of the war economy in the region.

Thus the scene has been set for complex regional politics involving conflicting interests and cross-cutting objectives.

The US no doubt continues to play its cards cautiously and pragmatically. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the meanwhile are reportedly engaged in deliberations to minimise the losses that will accrue to their respective states in the aftermath of 2014.

However, the most formidable competition in the context of Afghanistan is seen as the one between Pakistan and India. There is a body of opinion which holds that a major cause behind the instability in Afghanistan would be neutralised if the Indian and Pakistani security establishments agreed to cease their proxy war in Afghanistan.

Experts on the Afghan imbroglio and those who have been closely observing events leading to the withdrawal of the combat forces of Nato and the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan in 2014 suggest that the perceived geo-strategic and geo-economic imperatives of Pakistan and India are among the most vital strands of regional instability.

It has been observed in the last several years that the Pakistani security establishment has expressed concern over increasing Indian investment in the development of communications, education and healthcare facilities in Afghanistan.

In the view of the Pakistani security establishment, India’s premier intelligence agency, RAW, has been able to acquire a foothold in Afghanistan in the garb of development. On the other hand, the Indian government has blamed Pakistan’s ISI for attacks on its diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. Whatever the truth of these versions, it makes plain the serious distrust between the governments and security establishments of India and Pakistan.

Could there be any common ground for cooperation between Iran, Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the US, and especially between India and Pakistan, in the run-up to 2014 and after in Afghanistan?

The answer to this single question may decide the future of South and Central Asia in terms of strategic balance, economic well-being and political stability.

In fact, the answer would incorporate aspects of a broader civilisational role: how the wisdom and intelligence of visionaries, political leaderships, the academia, researchers, policymakers, security establishments, regional media and civil society organisations can coalesce to demystify and work positively to resolve a complex scenario.

The real test for the region’s political leadership lies in the success or otherwise of shunning the temptation before their respective security establishments to make gains at the cost of each other’s interests.

Academia across the political divide agrees that succumbing to the pressure of regional security establishments would mean further fuelling the security establishment-driven proxy wars in Afghanistan. It would be a matter of great significance if political leadership in the region can identify and work towards shared interests of their respective states.

The losses that have accrued to the states due to the current tensions among them have so far outweighed the results of all attempts to find common ground at the negotiation table.

There are at least three shared interests that should make for a vibrant debate among the intelligentsia and policymakers.

First, agreement on human security might become the rallying point for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to find positive goals which all can agree on, despite the complexity that prevails at the moment.

Second, the sovereignty and stability of Afghanistan as a state should be considered the central focus of shared interests — it would after all be an extension of the sovereignty and stability of the states promoting this as well.

Moreover, encouraging and helping the Afghans take a decision on their own political system and social institutions is instrumental for sustained peace and progress in South and Central Asia.

Third, the regional states (including Afghanistan) are home to large, culturally diverse communities. Cultural exchanges between these regions can pave the way for economic opportunities and a better understanding of security concerns.

The alternative to these points is an ugly scenario where regional states march stridently on the path of implosion. This can only have severe consequences for the region.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

khadimhussain565@gmail.com

Post-2014 AfPak

http://dawn.com/news/1035358/post-2014-afpak

AFTER reading several pieces in the print media and watching numerous talk shows on Afghanistan, one reaches the conclusion that we have a very limited understanding of this region, Afghanistan in particular.

Before deliberating upon the probable scenarios in Afghanistan after 2014 and their implications for Pakistan, it is pertinent to discuss some of the obstacles that hamper our understanding.

First, our academia in general has made limited effort to understand our neighbours. How many books have so far been written and published by our area study centres and Pakistan study centres on Afghanistan, Iran, India and China?

Then, most of the information on strategic issues regarding our neighbours is licensed instead of disseminated. This monopolisation of vital information by the security establishment has perhaps made our academia unconsciously complacent with respect to our region and especially Afghanistan. Another reason for this might be the real or perceived intimidation of the academia by various security agencies.

Second, we tend to look at the region in general and Afghanistan in particular either from the perspective of insecurity or with a sense of superiority. This tendency leads us to view everything happening in our western and eastern neighbourhood through the lens of paranoia.

Having said that, let’s try to imagine three distinct and mutually exclusive scenarios after 2014 in Afghanistan.

a) First, Kabul is overwhelmed by various factions of the Taliban and insurgents. After the establishment of an emirate in Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban ask their cousins in Pakistan to stop fighting against a state that was instrumental in making the emirate in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban lay down arms and live happily ever after.

b) The recently established state and security institutions in Afghanistan, with the support of regional and international stakeholders, put up fierce resistance against the Taliban onslaught. In that case, there will be a stalemate between the Taliban and the rest of Afghanistan.

c) The third scenario takes into consideration the challenges for peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including other states in the region, and envisions a three-tiered reconciliation process. The challenges include the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and state building and the establishment of sustainable political institutions in Afghanistan.

Despite the overriding desire of several state and non-state entities in Pakistan to see Kabul overwhelmed by the Afghan Taliban, it seems improbable that they will storm Kabul the way they did back in 1992. If there had been even a slight chance of this probability, the Taliban would have never agreed to peace talks with the US and the Afghan High Peace Council.

On the other hand, if the current Afghan government had been that spineless, the US would have never paid heed to its objection to the Taliban’s Doha office flag or plaque. Moreover, the Pakistani prime minister would have never sent his envoy to Kabul to appease the Afghan president if he were no more than a straw man.

If the first scenario, though it seems absolutely improbable, becomes a reality, its implications for Pakistan might be completely the opposite of what sections of the state and non-state entities here assume. Far from being a strategic gain for Pakistan, Kabul under the Taliban might be this country’s worst nightmare.

The sprawling militant network here might find it a good opportunity to unleash immense terror on the state and society. If they can fight for an emirate in Afghanistan, why wouldn’t they go for the same in Pakistan? It also uncertain whether the Afghan Taliban will de-link from Al Qaeda.

As for the second scenario, the present deadlock involving the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban and the non-inclusion of regional states in the efforts to find a solution to the challenge of peace in post-2014 Afghanistan indicate a stalemate. In this case, too, Pakistan will have a tough time. With an ideological and technical network in Punjab and Sindh and the needed physical infrastructure in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata, the militant network might be able to move around freely in southern and eastern Afghanistan and the adjacent tribal region in Pakistan.

Keeping in view the confusion in Pakistan’s military and political establishments with respect to dealing with extremism and terrorism, observers are of the opinion that some districts of KP earlier occupied by the Pakistani Taliban and later taken back by the military might see the resurgence of the militant network. They cite the continuous killing of members of peace committees in Swat, Buner and Dir districts in this regard. The Swat, Bajaur and Mohmand chapters of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan have already established centres of operations in the Kunar and Nuristan provinces in southern Afghanistan.

One can observe the expansion of the militant network in Pakistan in the shape of their ability to strike in Gilgit-Baltistan, Karachi, Sukkur, Quetta and Kurrum Agency within just one month. Observers also believe that the militant network has established its foothold in the suburban areas of south and southwest of Peshawar.

A win-win situation for Pakistan, Afghanistan, regional states, Nato and the insurgents groups in Afghanistan lies in the third scenario. If the reconciliation process among the Afghans (internally) and among the states in the region and international stakeholders is initiated simultaneously and is in sync with the reconstruction process and the political institutionalisation of Afghanistan, all stakeholders might emerge victorious.

This can only happen when all parties to the conflict make efforts at finding a shared interest in the solution. This cannot be achieved as long as all parties wish to show the other as the vanquished.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

khadimhussain565@gmail.com

Educational Reforms in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

http://pashtunwomenvp.com/index.php/2013-01-28-03-21-27/current-issue/307-pakhtunkhwa

 

It is interesting to note that the ‘working groups’ formed by the provincial government of Khyber Paktunkhwa for ‘reforms’ have almost made their recommendations public to some extent with the exception of education, especially curricula and textbooks. It seems recommendations of working group on curricula and textbooks have been shrouded in a weird kind of mystery. Hence, one can base analysis only on the sporadic hints that appear in media on and off.   

Only cursorily mentioning of the issues of access and governance, which may be pivotal for achieving Millennium Development Goals, what seems evident from the press reports since working group for reforms in education was formed in July 2013 is that Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf ( PTI), Jamati Islami (JI) and Qawmi Watan Party ( QWP) coalition in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has focused only on the following areas of quality of education:

1-      Medium of instruction

There seems to be an intriguing lack of understanding to differentiate between language education and medium of instruction. Two views seem to be prevailing in the government circles. The JI view, which might in all probability, prevails to achieve uniformity of education through imposing Urdu language as medium of instruction. The next step in their plan might be to nullify the Languages Act passed by the previous Provincial Assembly mainly represented by Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The Act had introduced indigenous languages like Pashto, Hindko, Seraiki, Torwali and Khwar as compulsory subjects in public schools in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The JI might also keep pushing for nullifying the Act on Languages Authority and might convert it into something like National Languages Authority with a focus on Urdu, Persian and Arabic.

The PTI dominant view in this regard seems to introduce English as medium of instruction so that graduates are able to be absorbed by the job market. Besides lack of capacity of majority of teachers to teach in English, this view utterly confuses English Language Education and medium of instruction. The working group has so far not touched English Language Teaching reforms, if press reports are to be believed.

2-      Curricular Narrative

The JI might push for doing away with the indigenous icons in Social Sciences replacing them with pan Islamist icons. Not only this, they seem to have an inclination to include those pan Islamist icons who might be remembered for their achievements in wars and imposition of their brand of religion on indigenous communities. The JI may also push for including verses from the Quran and Traditions of the Holy Prophet that relate to Qital with a specific perspective. For example, the JI ideologues in the working group might go for Sura Anfal and Sura Toba for 13 and 14 years old learners. Both of these Suras had been revealed for specific circumstances and cannot be used in a generalized manner according to scores of interpreters of the Quran. This seems to be in sync with the Salafi jihadist narrative that has brought about a shift in religious authority with respect to ‘Jihad’. On the one hand the Salafi Jihadists have equated ‘Jihad’ with ‘Qital’ and on the other hand they have authorized privatization of that ‘Qital’.                  

The JI and some in PTI might, in all probability, lobby to segregate curricula leading to religious, sectarian, gender and ethnic marginalization in terms of the discourse of representation. The JI might also manipulate to have more quantity of Salafi religious contents in Islamic Studies. Pan Islamist narrative of history might be incorporated into the textbooks with the argument to fulfill the demands of ‘Islamic Education’ enshrined in the constitution of Pakistan. The social sciences and Islamic Studies textbooks might be re-written with the intent to purge them of indigenous narratives, indigenous history, modern civilization and critical thinking. Liberal arts will most probably be curbed in all levels of education.

3-      Academic environment

What seems ahead is that through mainstream media and through religious educational networks, pressure would be exerted on educational institutions of all categories to ensure gender segregation. This discourse seems to be manipulated in media in the shape of a popular demand for ‘pure’ and ‘sacred’ education. The walls of public schools and their class rooms might again be decorated and painted with the verses of Iqbal that teach Muslims to conquer the world, especially India, Israel and America. The overall environment will again be closed a little more leaving no space for any kind of rational debate. Questioning in the class-room and entertainment outside the class-room might be strangulated in the garb of a particular interpretation of Islam. The first victims of this educational paradigm might be women and ethno-lingual and ethno-religious minorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Rahman Baba, Khushal Khan Khattak, Ghani Khan and Bacha Khan might again be banished from the academic world on the one hand and the indigenous discourse of non-violence and pluralism might be undermined on the other hand. The emphasis would remain on recruiting those as teachers who more or less think the way the JI ideologues think.

4-      Higher Education

It seems all the centers of excellence, educational boards and administrative positions would be manned by those who pay allegiance to the discourse of segregation, jihadization (Qital), and centralization. For this to happen, they would probably burry the constitutional obligation of a Provincial Educational Council on the one hand and push for Amendment to the Universities Act on the other hand.

Research proposal on Free Masons, Indian Evil Designs on Pakistan, the 3rd World war, features of Islamic Society, Islamic Banking, and wars by the Muslim generals would be encouraged in the faculties of Social Sciences and Humanities.

Shouldn’t the working group on education make their recommendations public, especially those that pertain to curriculum and textbooks?

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar. Email: khadimhussain565@gmail.com Twitter/@khadimhussain4

Collective Amnesia

http://pashtunwomenvp.com/index.php/2013-01-28-03-21-27/current-issue/305-khadim-hussain

A scene from Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s Nobel Prize winning novel, One Hundred Years of Solitude, has vaguely remained my memory for a long time. The scene is about a gun battle  in 1967 between liberals and conservatives in Macondo city. The conservatives, being in power, have all the state resources to construct and disseminate propaganda. Leader and commander of the liberal force gets seriously injured and is left dying in pool of blood, perceived as dead after his force is defeated. Early next morning when the Colonel comes to consciousness, he is taken aback by the fact that there are no traces of a ferocious gun battle in the main square of the city. While moving to his house, he keeps asking about the gun battle last night but nobody in the city seems to be aware of the incident. The Colonel, severely injured, wishes to lose his memory but of no avail while on the other hand people around him start doubting him to have lost his mind . The people of the town keep arguing with each other regarding the claims of the Colonel while the Colonel himself starts showing signs of abnormality. The era in the novel seems to depict political and ideological wars in 17th and 18th Century Europe.

Since then , states around the globe have achieved sophisticated techniques to monopolize construction and dissemination of political and security narratives. The narratives mostly pertain to the prolonging of political arrangements to keep wielding, using and distributing power.

The events in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a north western province of Pakistan, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) in the last three weeks provide an interesting case study as to how narratives are constructed, used, and disseminated through media that sideline the issues having direct bearing on the common masses.

On July 26 2013, twin blasts in Parachinar (Headquarters of Kurrum Agency) left almost 57 dead and 167 critically injured1. The locals on the other day expressed their emotions:              

Hussain said almost all the dead and wounded were Shias. Moreover, Ali said at the time of the explosion the market was full of Shias, who were buying items for their evening meal that breaks the daytime fast during the holy month of Ramazan. ''We demand protection. We request the government to take action against those who routinely kill our people,'' he told The Associated Press. One of the blasts was carried out by a suicide bomber while the other might have been a planted one, Political Agent Riaz Mehsud said.[2]

Target killing of Peace Committees, police officials and Shias has remained a routine matter in the meanwhile. On August 2, two policemen and a House Station Officer (SHO) were shot dead in Daudzai in the suburbs of Peshawar.[3] A member of the Peace Committee was shot dead in Kabal Tehsil of Swat distrct on July 24 2013.[4] These are just two of the dozens acts of target killings that continue in Peshawar and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa unabattedly.

On July 30, “As many as 243 prisoners escaped as militants carrying heavy weapons stormed Dera Ismail Khan’s Central Jail, holding as many as 5,000 prisoners including 250 inmates belonging to various banned outfits here on late Monday night, Geo News reported.”[5]

These unfortunate events would have been considered as part of the war the militant network has launched against the state and society of Pakistan, especially Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, had both the state and private electronic and print media of Pakistan not melted the story through other high profile stories that have little or no direct bearing on the citizens. Let me count the events that were hyped by media in the meanwhile which intentionally or unintentionally sidelined the terror events mentioned above.

A controversy on presidential election that was destined to be won by PML-N made banner headlines in print media and occupied more than 70% of time in electronic media which successfully marginalized killings in Parachinar.

After section of media started reporting target killings, news of the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan started doing the rounds. The stories of target killings thus relegated to cold storage by mainstream media.

As if it were not enough, when media started analyzing various aspects of the DI Khan jailbreak, another high profile issue occupied almost the whole space of print and electronic media. Supreme Court of Pakistan issued a show cause notice to Chairman Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan. This issue successfully engaged print media, electronic media and social media in a way unprecedented in this part of the world.

Is it demand of the consumers for a story as some media exponents would argue or depiction of a stark reality of the political economy of Pakistan? Is it information, education and entertainment as classical journalism envisages or monopoly on construction, distribution and dissemination of narratives that are related to power? Does this phenomenon indicate thirst for information by the common masses or does this signify hold of power by the political, corporate, and military and intelligence elite and urban middle classes in the state structures of Pakistan?

Academia in this part of the world has so far failed to analyze the above questions that have close relationship with the political economy of the state of Pakistan for three reasons besides lethargy. Firstly, most of the academia that resides in the urban centers has a share in the monopoly of the narratives and hence has some share in the hold of power by the elite and urban middle classes. Secondly, the overbearing state institutions on the one hand and the militant network on the other hand have successfully permeated fear with respect to evidence based analysis that might lead to a difference of opinion with respect to popular narratives. Thirdly, socio-cultural space for the dissenting narratives has been reduced to the extent that academia might not lay its hands on something that might touch the boundaries of non-conformism.

Brazen jailbreak

http://dawn.com/news/1033762/brazen-jailbreak

THE Bannu jailbreak in April 2012 saw 400 inmates, including well-known militant commander Adnan Rasheed, released by militants. The Dera Ismail Khan (D.I. Khan) jailbreak some days ago saw almost 250 inmates, including hardened militant commanders, freed by the attackers.

Bannu in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is adjacent to North Waziristan while D.I. Khan is adjacent to South Waziristan. D.I. Khan is some 100 km from South Waziristan and a two-and-a-half-hour drive from North Waziristan. Similarities and differences between the two jailbreaks are relevant to the understanding of the new strategy of jailbreaks adopted by Pakistani militants.

The Bannu prison had almost 900 inmates while D.I. Khan had some 500 inmates. The Bannu jailbreak was carried out an hour after midnight while the latest attack was executed an hour before midnight. In both militant operations, some 100 to 150 fighters took part.

In the case of the Bannu jailbreak, prior intelligence to the local administration, prison authorities and provincial government was not available while the opposite was true in D.I. Khan’s case. A day before the D.I. Khan jailbreak, a scuffle between the prison authorities and the prisoners had been reported while in the case of Bannu this had not happened.

In both cases, it had taken security reinforcements a long time to reach the premises and help prison security counter the attacks. Questions have been raised about the coordination and performance of security agencies in the case of Bannu then and almost the same questions have been raised in the present instance.

In neither case was insider support discounted. A report had been submitted by the home department in the case of Bannu and a judicial inquiry ordered. The same is the case regarding D.I. Khan — a report has been submitted and an inquiry, the nature of which is unknown, has been ordered by the KP chief minister.

The militant network has shown it has the upper hand in some aspects of strategy as evident in both cases. First, the militant network has been able to prove beyond doubt that it has achieved the fast execution of tactical operations. It also appears that it now has the ability to gather credible intelligence. In addition to this, it has also refined operational planning of why, where, how and when to attack.

In the case of D.I. Khan, the attack was three-pronged. The first party of militants carried out successive blasts which locals claim might not be less than 35 in number. This led to panic among the security personnel present inside the prison. Another squad that had grenades and heavy weapons broke through the main gate of the prison under the cover of heavy firing. A third party was deployed to ambush any reinforcements that arrived to help the prison authorities. This kind of sophisticated tactical operation seems to have been planned meticulously on the basis of refined intelligence gathering and superb networking capacity.

The second aspect where the militant network seems to have honed its skills is the use of modern technology. In the case of D.I. Khan, night vision equipment was used besides modern weapons and vehicles. They must have also used Google Maps to obtain precision and speed.

The third aspect can be seen in the militants’ skilful media management.

Hence, on the one hand the militant network has been able to push back security and law enforcement agencies and on the other the network has been able to enhance fear by carrying out attacks aimed at large-scale destruction as happened in the case of Parachinar recently. The militant network has been able to put across its message effectively, creating confusion among ordinary people, the political leadership and security agencies.

Against this backdrop, when one observes the specific strategy of jailbreaks aimed at freeing hardened militants, one finds several lacunae in the planning of the security and law enforcement agencies. First, there is the virtual absence of networking among the prison authorities, law enforcement agencies and security agencies at the local level.

This lack of networking and coordination has now been exposed in almost all successful attacks carried out by militants across the country for the last several years. In the case of D.I. Khan, intelligence reports had already been given to the relevant authorities but no coordination meeting was held among the local commands of security agencies, law enforcement agencies and prison authorities.

Second, security and law enforcement agencies seem to either lack modern technology or the skill to use modern technology. In the former it is the lack of resources and in the latter it is the lack of training and capacity build-up.

Third, as the militant network seems to have launched both an ideological and terrorist military onslaught on the state of Pakistan from all sides, a high level of preparedness on the part of security and law enforcement agencies is of utmost importance. This can only happen when the political leadership, security establishment and law enforcement agencies are on the same page. Besides, there is a need to improve the physical counterterrorism infrastructure and have theoretical clarity. It seems to be a collective failure for which collective responsibility must be taken.

In the case D.I. Khan, the prison authorities complain about the lack of resources and security while intelligence agencies claim that they had passed on timely information. The KP government holds the intelligence agencies responsible. The public, on the other hand, seems to be in the dark and hence confused as to whether it is the complicity, lack of will or lack of capacity of the state of Pakistan to defend it.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

khadimhussain565@gmail.com

‘Pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’

When Arundhati Roy candidly wrote about the discourse of ‘Anti-Americanism’ through which dissenting voices are suppressed, she was obviously talking about the American establishment. What if she had been living and engaged in activism in Pakistan? Would she have written about the discourse of ‘pro-Americanism’ through which dissenting voices are suppressed by sections of media, urban middle classes and sections of the state’s establishment of Pakistan? 

Ms. Roy writes:

To call someone anti-American, indeed, to be anti American, (or for that matter anti-Indian, or anti-Timbuktuan ) is not just racist, it’s a failure of the imagination. An inability to see the world in terms other than those that the establishment has set out for you: If you’re not a Bushie, you’re a Taliban. If you don’t love us, you hate us. If you’re not Good, you’re Evil. If you’re not with us, you’re with the terrorists.[1]

Just change the adjectives and subject determiner a bit and you find a very interesting co-relation the opposite of what Arundhati Roy proclaims but with the same effect. May it like this that to call someone anti-Talibanization, indeed, to be against the militant disocurse necessarily mean pro-American? And this is also in an environment where pro-Americanism incites the worst kind of violence. Even if not violence, at least suppression of one’s voice or loss of political support.  The discourse of pro-Americanism has interesting denominations in Pakistan. You would be considered a good Muslim and a patriot when you supported the US war against the Soviets by terming it jihad in Afghanistan back in 1980s. You are the worst kind of a traitor and pro-American if you refuse to accept the discourse of violent extremism in Pakistan that has damaged only and only the state and society of Pakistan. To understand relationship of violent extremism in Pakistan and American presence and drone strikes, please read my blog on http://hussainkhadim79.blogspot.com/2013/06/imran-khans-press-conference-in.html.     

I have otherwise great respect for Rahimullah Yousufzai, a veteran journalist working in The News, but it is in the interest of the fundamental human right that one expresses his/her difference of opinion in matters related to our collective life. It is perhaps true for respectable Rahimullah Yousufzai as much as for a common citizen like me.      

                                      

While discussing ANP- JUI seat-to-seat adjustment for by-elections 2013 in his piece published in the News on Sunday on July 28 2013, Rahimullah sahib has decreed that ANP is a Pro-US political party.  Irrespective of the fact that one would have expected the same kind of analysis during pre 2013 polls on the JUI –QWP seat-to-seat adjustment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on the one hand and PML-N Balochs and Pakhtun Nationalist Parties in Balochistan on the other hand, let’s concentrate on the core issue of ‘Pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’ discourse. Before  dilating on the issue of ‘pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’, let’s first analyze the statement per se and find some visible logical fallacies there.  

First, who makes foreign policy in Pakistan? If a political party in Pakistan is even unable to talk about foreign policy, how come it is dubbed pro or anti any other country? If the statement means that ANP has not declared jihad against the Americans in Afghanistan after 2011, then which other political party has so far done it?   

Second, what are the indicators of being ‘pro-US’ and ‘Anti-US’?  Is it worldview? If working for a modern polity and use of modern technology constitutes this worldview, then perhaps even Taliban share the same worldview.  Is it strategic, which of course includes support or not support for drones? A veteran like Rahimullah Yousufzai might certainly remember that it was only ANP which took protest rally against the drone strike in Bajaur in 2006. Is it political, which certainly includes dialogue with those militant organizations which can delink from Al-Qaeda? Again our senior journalist might remember that ANP initiated dialogue with the Taliban in Swat in 2008 despite substantial American pressure.

Third, the discourse of hegemony and resistance to hegemony in Pakistan perhaps originates from the politics of Khudai Khidmatgars and National Awami Party—both the predecessors of ANP.                                                

I leave it to the imagination and information of the readers to find out the history of relations between the US and Pakistan starting from 1950s till date.

---

[1] Arundhati Roy. An ordinary person’s guide to empire. Dheli: Penguin. 2005